Abstract. We address the problem of polynomial time factoring RSA moduli N1 = p1q1 with the help of an oracle. As opposed to other approaches that require an oracle that explicitly outputs bits of p1, we use an oracle that gives only implicit information about p1. Namely, our oracle outputs a different N2 = p2q2 such that p1 and p2 share the t least significant bits. Surprisingly, this implicit information is already sufficient to efficiently factor N1, N2 provided that t is large enough. We then generalize this approach to more than one oracle query.
Introduction
Factoring large integers is one of the most fundamental problems in algorithmic number theory and lies at the heart of RSA's security. Consequently, since the invention of RSA in 1977 [18] there have been enormous efforts for finding efficient factorization algorithms. The Quadratic Sieve [16] , the Elliptic Curve Method [9] and eventually the Number Field Sieve [10] have led to a steady progress in improving the factorization complexity. However, since 1993 there is little progress from the complexity theoretic point of view when using classical Turing machines as the model of computation.
Shor's algorithm from 1994 [19] demonstrates that the factorization problem is polynomial time solvable on quantum Turing machines. Nowadays, it seems to be highly unclear whether these machines can ever be realized in practice.
The so-called oracle complexity of the factorization problem was first studied at Eurocrypt 1985 by Rivest and Shamir [17] , who showed that N = pq can be factored given an oracle that provides an attacker with bits of one of the prime factors. The task is to factor in polynomial time by asking as few as possible queries to the oracle. Rivest and Shamir showed that 3 5 log p queries suffice in order to factor efficiently.
At Eurocrypt 1992, Maurer [12] allowed for an oracle that is able to answer any type of questions by YES/NO answers. Using this powerful oracle, he showed that log p oracle queries are sufficient for any > 0 in order to factor efficiently. At Eurocrypt 1996, Coppersmith [2] in turn improved the Rivest-Shamir oracle complexity for most significant bits to 1 2 log p queries. Coppersmith used this result to break the Vanstone-Zuccherato ID-based cryptosytem [21] that leaks half of the most significant bits.
In this work, we highly restrict the power of the oracle. Namely, we allow for an oracle that on input an RSA modulus N 1 = p 1 q 1 outputs another different RSA modulus N 2 = p 2 q 2 such that p 1 , p 2 share their t least significant bits. Moreover, we assume for notational simplicity that the bit-sizes of p 2 , q 2 are equal to the bit-sizes of p 1 , q 1 , respectively.
Thus, as opposed to an oracle that explicitly outputs bits of the prime factor p 1 , we only have an oracle that implicitly gives information about the bits of p 1 . Intuitively, since N 2 is a hard to factor RSA modulus, it should not be possible to extract this implicit information. We show that this intuition is false. Namely, we show that the link of the factorization problems N 1 and N 2 gives rise to an efficient factorization algorithm provided that t is large enough.
More precisely, let q 1 and q 2 be α-bit numbers. Then our lattice-based algorithm provably factors N 1 , N 2 with N 1 = N 2 in quadratic time whenever t > 2(α + 1). In order to give a numerical example: Let N 1 , N 2 have 750-bit p 1 , p 2 and 250-bit q 1 , q 2 . Then the factorization of N 1 , N 2 can be efficiently found provided that p 1 , p 2 share more than 502 least significant bits. The bound t > 2(α + 1) implies that our first result works only for imbalanced RSA moduli. Namely, the prime factors p i have to have bit-sizes larger than twice the bit-sizes of the q i .
Using more than one oracle query, we can further improve upon the bound on t. In the case of k−1 queries, we obtain N 2 , . . . , N k different RSA moduli such that all p i share the least t significant bits. This gives rise to a lattice attack with a k-dimensional lattice L having a short vector q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) that immediately yields the factorization of all N 1 , . . . , N k . For constant k, our algorithm runs in time polynomial in the bit-size of the RSA moduli. As opposed to our first result, in the general case we are not able to prove that our target vector q is a shortest vector in the lattice L. Thus, we leave this as a heuristic assumption. This heuristic is supported by a counting argument and by experimental results that demonstrate that we are almost always able to efficiently find the factorization.
Moreover, when asking k − 1 queries for RSA moduli with α-bit q i that share t least significant bits of the p i , we improve our bound to t ≥ k k−1 α. Hence for a larger number k of queries our bound converges to t ≥ α, which means that the p i should at least coincide on α bits, where α is the bit-size of the q i . In the case of RSA primes of the same bit-size, this result tells us that N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p 1 q k with the same p 1 can efficiently be factored, which is trivially true by greatest common divisor computations. On the other hand, our result is highly non-trivial whenever the bit-sizes are not balanced.
If we do not restrict ourselves to polynomial running time, then we can easily adapt our method to also factor balanced RSA moduli. All that we have to do is to determine a small quantity of the bits of q i by brute force search. Using these bits we can apply the previous method in order to determine at least half of the bits of all q i . The complete factorization of all RSA moduli N i is then retrieved by the aforementioned lattice-based algorithm of Coppersmith [3] .
Currently, we are not aware of an RSA key generation that uses primes sharing least significant bits. The Steinfeld-Zheng system [20] uses moduli N = pq such that p, q itself share least significant bits, for which our algorithm does not apply. Naturally, one application of our result is malicious key generation of RSA moduli, i.e. the construction of backdoored RSA moduli [5, 22] .
Another application is a novel kind of attack on a public key generator. Suppose an attacker succeeds to manipulate those t registers of an RSA public key generator that hold the least significant bits of one prime factor such that these registers are stuck to some unknown value. E.g., take an attacker that simply destroys the registers with the help of a laser beam such that he has no control on the register's values. If the RSA key parameters are within our bounds, the attacker can easily collect sufficiently many RSA moduli that allow him to factor all of them. Thus, he uses the RSA key generator as an oracle. Notice that the RSA generator will usually not even notice such an attack since the RSA moduli look innocent.
Moreover, we feel that our algorithm will be useful for constructive cryptographic applications as well. Consider the task that our oracle has to solve, which we call the one more RSA modulus problem, i.e one has to produce on input an RSA modulus N = pq other moduli N i = p i q i whose factors p i share their least significant bits.
Our construction shows that this problem is for many parameter settings equivalent to the factorization problem. So the one more RSA modulus problem might serve as a basis for various cryptographic primitives, whose security is then in turn directly based on factoring (imbalanced) integers.
In addition to potential applications, we feel that our result is of strong theoretical interest, since we show for the first time that quite surprisingly implicit information is sufficient in order to factor efficiently. In turn, this implies that already a really weak form of an oracle suffices for achieving a polynomial time factorization process. In the oracle-based line of research, reducing the number of queries and diminishing the power of the oracles is the path that leads to a better understanding of the complexity of the underlying factorization problem.
We organize our paper as follows. In Section 2, we give the necessary facts about lattices. In Section 3, we introduce our rigorous construction with one oracle query, i.e. with two RSA moduli. In Section 4, we generalize our construction to an arbitrary fixed number of queries. This makes our construction heuristic. In Section 5, we adapt our heuristic construction to the case of balanced RSA moduli. In Section 6, we experimentally confirm the validity of our heuristics.
Preliminaries
An integer lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Z
n . An alternative equivalent definition of an integer lattice can be given via a basis.
Let
n be linearly independent vectors. Then the set of all integer linear combinations of the b i spans an integer lattice L, i.e. Let us denote by ||v|| the Euclidean 2 -norm of a vector v. Hadamard's inequality [13] relates the length of the basis vectors to the determinant.
The successive minima λ i (L) of the lattice L are defined as the minimal radius of a ball containing i linearly independent lattice vectors of L. In a twodimensional lattice L, basis vectors v 1 , v 2 with lengths ||v 1 || = λ 1 (L) and ||v 2 || = λ 2 (L) are efficiently computable via Gaussian reduction.
n be basis vectors of a two-dimensional lattice L. Then the Gauss-reduced lattice basis vectors v 1 , v 2 can be determined in time O(log 2 (max{||v 1 || , ||v 2 ||}). Furthermore,
Information on Gaussian reduction and its running time can be found in [13] .
A shortest vector of a lattice satisfies the Minkowski bound, which relates the length of a shortest vector to the determinant and dimension of the lattice.
Vectors with short norm can be computed by the LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász [11] .
n . Then the LLL algorithm outputs a reduced basis v 1 , . . . , v d with the following property:
The running time of this algorithm is O(d 4 n(d+log b max ) log b max ), where b max ∈ N denotes the largest entry in the basis matrix.
For a proof of the upper bound of a shortest LLL vector compare [11] . The running time is the running time of the so-called L 2 -algorithm, an efficient LLL version due to Nguyen and Stehlé [15] .
The LLL algorithm can be used for factoring integers with partly known factors as Coppersmith showed in [3] .
Theorem 4 ([3] Theorem 5).
Let N be an n-bit composite number. Then we can find the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time if we know the low order n 4 bits of p.
Implicit Factoring of Two RSA Moduli
Assume that we are given two different RSA moduli for some common p that is unknown to us. Can we use the information that the prime factors of N 1 and N 2 share their t least significant bits without knowing these bits explicitly? I.e., can we factor N 1 , N 2 given only implicit information about one of the factors?
In this section, we will answer this question in the affirmative. Namely, we will show that there is an algorithm that recovers the factorization of N 1 and N 2 in quadratic time provided that t is sufficiently large. We start with
These two equations contain five unknowns p, p 1 , p 2 , q 1 and q 2 . By reducing both equations modulo 2 t , we can eliminate the two unknownsp 1 ,p 2 and get
Since q 1 , q 2 are odd, we can solve both equations for p. This leaves us with N1 q1 ≡ N2 q2 mod 2 t , which we write in form of the linear equation
The set of solutions
forms an additive, discrete subgroup of Z 2 . Thus, L is a 2-dimensional integer lattice. L is spanned by the row vectors of the basis matrix
Let us briefly check that the integer span of B L , denoted by span(B L
Notice that by Eq. (1), we have (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ L. If we were able to find this vector in L then we could factor N 1 , N 2 easily. Let us first provide some intuition under which condition the vector q = (q 1 , q 2 ) is a short vector in L. We know that the length of the shortest vector is upper bounded by the Minkowski bound
Since we assumed that q 1 , q 2 are α-bit primes, we have q 1 , q 2 ≤ 2 α . If α is sufficiently small, then ||q|| is smaller than the Minkowski bound and, therefore, we can expect that q is among the shortest vectors in L. This happens if
So if t ≥ 2α we expect that q is a short vector in L. We can find a shortest vector in L using Gaussian reduction on the lattice basis B in time O(log 2 (2 t )) = O(log 2 (min{N 1 , N 2 })). Hence, under the heuristic assumption that q = (q 1 , q 2 ) is a shortest vector in L we can factor N 1 , N 2 in quadratic time. Under a slightly more restrictive condition, we can completely remove the heuristic assumption.
be the lattice basis defined as before.
B L spans a lattice L with shortest vector v that satisfies
Performing Gaussian reduction on B L , we get an equivalent basis
Our goal is to show that b 1 = ±q = ±(q 1 , q 2 ) which is sufficient for factoring
As L is of full rank, by Hadamard's inequality we have
This implies
Substituting det(L) = 2 t and using λ 1 (L) ≤ 2 t+1 2 leads to
This implies for any lattice vector v = a 1 b 1 + a 2 b 2 with ||v|| < 2 t−1 2 that a 2 = 0, as otherwise λ 2 (L) ≤ ||v|| < ||b 2 || which contradicts the optimality of b 2 from Theorem 1. Thus, every v with ||v|| < 2
. Consequently, we have ||q|| < ||b 2 || if 2 2α+1 2
Therefore, we get q = ab 1 for some a ∈ Z − {0}. Let b 1 = (b 11 , b 12 ), then gcd(q 1 , q 2 ) = gcd(ab 11 , ab 12 ) ≥ a. But q 1 , q 2 are primes and wlog q 1 = q 2 , since otherwise we can factor N 1 , N 2 by computing gcd (N 1 , N 2 ) . Therefore, |a| = 1 and we obtain q = ±b 1 , which completes the factorization.
The running time of the factorization is determined by the running time of the Gaussian reduction, which can be performed in O(t 2 ) = O(log 2 (min{N 1 , N 2 })) steps.
Implicit Factoring of k RSA Moduli
The approach from the previous section can be generalized to an arbitrary fixed number k − 1 of oracle queries. This gives us k different RSA moduli
We transform the system of equations into a system of k equations modulo 2
. . .
Analogous to the two equation case, we solve each equation for p. This can be done because all the q i are odd. Thus, we get 
With the same arguments as in the preceding section the set
forms a lattice. This lattice L is spanned by the row vectors of the following basis matrix
Thus, if q is indeed a shortest vector then
This implies the condition t ≥ k k−1 α. We make the following heuristic assumption. We show the validity of Assumption 6 experimentally in Section 6.
The running time is determined by the time to compute a shortest vector in L [8, 7] . This implies that for any lattice L of rank k such that k k 2 = poly(max i {log N i }), i.e. especially for lattices with fixed rank k, we can compute the factorization of all N i in time polynomial in their bit-size.
For large k, our bound converges to t ≥ α. This means that the amount t of common least significant bits has to be at least as large as the bit-size of the q i . In turn, this implies that our result only applies to RSA moduli with different bit-sizes of p i and q i . On the other hand, this is the best result that we could hope for in our algorithm. Notice that we construct the values of the q i by solving equations modulo 2 t . Thus, we can fully recover the q i only if their bit-size α is smaller than t. In the subsequent section, we will overcome this problem by avoiding the full recovery of all q i , which in turn leads to an algorithm for balanced RSA moduli.
Remark: All of our results still hold if 2 t is replaced by an arbitrary modulus M ≥ 2 t . We used a power of two only to illustrate our results in terms of bits.
Implicit Factoring of Balanced RSA Moduli
We slightly adapt the method from Section 4 in order to factor balanced n-bit integers, i. e. N i = p i q i such that p i and q i have bitsize n 2 each. The modification mainly incorporates a small brute force search on the most significant bits.
Assume that we are given k RSA moduli as in (2) . From these moduli we derive k − 1 linear equations in k variables:
The bitsize of the q i is now fixed to α = n 2 which is equal to the bitsize of the p i , i. e. now the number t of bits on which the p i coincide has to satisfy t ≤ α. In the trivial case of t = α = n 2 we can directly factor the N i via greatest common divisor computations as then p i = p for i = 1, . . . , k.
Thus, we only consider t < n 2 . With a slight modification of the method in Section 4, we compute all q i (mod 2 t ). Since t < n 2 , this does not give us the q i directly, but only their t least significant bits. But if t ≥ n 4 , we can use Theorem 4 for finding the full factorization of each N i in polynomial time. In order to minimize the time complexity, we assume t = n 4 throughout this section. To apply Theorem 7 of Section 4 the bit-size of the q i has to be smaller than k−1 k t. Thus, we have to guess roughly 1 k · t = n 4k bits for each q i . Since we consider k moduli, we have to guess a total number of n 4 bits. Notice that this is the same amount of bits as for guessing one half of the bits of one q j , which in turn allows to efficiently find this q j using Theorem 4. With a total amount of n 4 bits however, our algorithm will allow us to efficiently find all q i , i = 1, . . . , k.
Let us describe our modification more precisely. We split q i (mod 2
holds. We therefore choose β to be the largest integer smaller than (k−1)n 4k . This implies that the x i ≤ 2 β are small enough to be determined analogous to Section 4, provided that theq i are known. As discussed before, in practice we can guess an amount of n 4k bits for determining eachq i , or we can find these bits by other means, e.g. by side-channel attacks.
Suppose now that theq i are given for each i. We obtain the following set of equations
.
. . , k, denote the known right-hand terms. In contrast to Section 4, the equations (4) that we have to solve are inhomogenous. Let us first consider the lattice L that consists of the homogenous solutions
L is spanned by the rows of the following basis matrix
Moreover, if we define the target vector c := (0, c 2 , . . . , c k ), then the distance between q and c is
. This is the same bound that we achieved in Section 4 for the length of a shortest vector in Eq. (3) when t = n 4 . So instead of solving a shortest vector problem, we have to solve a closest vector problem in L with target vector c. Closest vectors can be found in polynomial time for fixed lattice dimension k (see Blömer [1] ). We make the heuristic assumption that q is indeed a closest vector to c in L. The running time is determined by the time for guessing eachq i and the time for finding a closest vector in L.
About our Heuristic Assumptions
In this section we have a closer look at the two heuristics from the previous sections, Assumption 6 and Assumption 8. We first give a counting argument that supports our heuristics and then demonstrate experimentally that our constructions work very well in practice.
A Counting Argument that Supports our Assumptions
Recall that in Section 4, the lattice L consists of all solutions q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) of the system of equations
As gcd(N −1 1 N i , 2 t ) = 1 for any i, the mapping f i :
1 N i x (mod 2 t ) is bijective. Therefore, the value of q 1 uniquely determines the values of q i , i = 2, . . . , k.
In total the system of equations has as many solutions as there are values to choose q 1 from, which is 2 t . Now suppose q 1 ≤ 2
. How many vectors q do we have such that q i ≤ 2 (k−1)t k for all i = 1, . . . , k and thus ||q|| ≤ √ k2
(k−1)t k ? Assume for each i = 2, ..., k that the value q i is uniformly distributed in {0, . . . , 2 t − 1} and that the distributions of q i and q j are independent if i = j.
Then the probability that q i ≤ 2
Furthermore, the probability that q i ≤ 2
Consequently, for a given value of q 1 ≤ 2
the expected number of vectors q such that q i ≤ 2
we expect that only one lattice vector, namely q, is short enough to satisfy the Minkowski bound. Hence, we expect that ±q is a unique shortest vector in L if its length is significantly below the bound √ k2
. This counting argument strongly supports our Assumption 6.
Remark: In order to analyze Assumption 8 we can argue in a completely analogous manner. The inhomogenous character of the equations does not influence the fact that the q i are uniquely determined by q 1 .
Experiments
We verified our assumptions in practice by running experiments on a Core2 Duo 1.66GHz notebook. The attacks were implemented using Magma 1 Version 2.11. Instead of taking a lattice reduction algorithm which provably returns a basis with a shortest vector as first basis vector we have used the LLL algorithm [11] , more precisely its L 2 version of Nguyen and Stehlé [15] which is implemented in Magma. Although by LLL reduction the first basis vector only approximates a shortest vector in a lattice, for our lattice bases with dimensions up to 100 LLL-reduction was sufficient. In nearly all cases the first basis vector was equal to the vector ±q = ±(q 1 , . . . , q k ), when we chose suitable attack parameters.
First, we considered the cased of imbalanced RSA moduli from Theorem 7. We chose N i = (p + 2 tp i )q i , i = 1, . . . , k, of bit-size n = 1000 with varying bitsizes of q i . For fixed bitsize α of q i and fixed number k of moduli, we slightly played with the parameter t of common bits close to the bound t ≥ k k−1 α in order to determine the minimal t for which our heuristic is valid. The running time of all experiments was below 10 seconds.
1 http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/magma/
In Table 1 , we called an experiment successful if the first basis vector b 1 in our LLL reduced basis was of the form b 1 = ±q = ±(q 1 , . . . , q k ), i.e. it satisfied Assumption 6. There were some cases, where other basis vectors were of the form ±q, but we did not consider these cases.
As one can see by the experimental results, Assumption 6 only works smoothly when our instances were a few extra bits beyond the bound of Theorem 7. This is not surprising since the counting argument from Section 6.1 tells us that we loose uniqueness of the shortest vector as we approach the theoretical bound. In practice, one could either slightly increase the number t of shared bits or the number k of oracle calls for making the attack work.
Analogously, we made experiments with balanced RSA moduli to verify Assumption 8. Instead of computing closest vectors directly, we used the well-known standard embedding of a d-dimensional closest vector problem into an (d + 1)-dimensional shortest vector problem ( [6] , Chapter 4.1), where the shortest vector is of the form b 1 = (q − c, c ), c constant. Since c and c are known, this directly yields q and therefore the factorization of all RSA moduli. For solving the shortest vector problem, we again used the LLL algorithm.
As before we called an experiment successful, if b 1 was of the desired form, i.e. if Assumption 8 held. In our experiments we used 1000 bit N i with a common share p of t = 250 bits. Table 2 . Attack for balanced 1000-bit Ni with 250 bits shared
All of our experiments ran in less than 10 seconds. Here, we assumed that we know the required bits of each q i , i.e. the running time does not include the factor for a brute-force search.
Similar to the experimental results for the imbalanced RSA case, our heuristic Assumption 8 works well in the balanced case, provided that we spend a few extra bits to the theoretical bound in order to enforce uniqueness of the closest vector.
